Fully Hashed MQV (FHMQV)

MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) is an authenticated protocol for key agreement based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. Like other authenticated Diffie-Hellman schemes, MQV provides protection against attackers. The protocol can be modified to work in elliptic curve groups where it is known as Elliptic Curve MQV (ECMQV).

The cryptology paper ‘A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol’ by Augustin P Sarr, Philippe Elbaz-Vincent, and Jean-Claude Bajard, sets out the proposal for a Fully Hashed MQV (FHMQV). It describes how the Exponential Challenge Response (XRC) and Dual Exponential Challenge Response (DCR) signature schemes are the building blocks of the HMQV protocol.

Impersonation and Man In The Middle attacks can be mounted against the HMQV protocol when some session specific information leakages happen, and this defines the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXRC) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes. When using these schemes the Fully Hashed MQV protocol (with security arguments) preserves the performance of the (H)MQV protocols and resists attack.

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "MQV".